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Mind that Abides. Panpsychism in the new millennium
"Mind that Abides. Panpsychism in the new millennium" belongs to Grant's nature-philosophy line, where Schelling, world, and transcendental speculation reframe the archive through cosmology rather than cybernetic meltdown.
Archive condition
The page uses the canonical extracted text as its reading layer while preserving the original file paths as the archival source of record.
Core idea
These pages matter because they give the archive a different philosophical afterlife from Brassier's rationalist critique. Grant reopens nature, world, and Schelling as live speculative resources rather than treating modernity as exhausted by capital or nihilism.
The mechanism is transcendental and cosmological at once. Nature is treated as productive, self-differentiating, and conceptually generative, so philosophy becomes a way of tracking world-process rather than merely critiquing representation.
That matters because the site needs to distinguish Grant's nature philosophy from both CCRU accelerationism and speculative-realist branding. This cluster keeps visible a cosmological branch of the afterlife that would otherwise be flattened into generic realism.
How to read this text
Read first for how nature or world is being defined before moving into the denser speculative vocabulary around it.
Track where Schelling, cosmology, or transcendental argument stop being historical reference and become live conceptual machinery.
Representative extracts
Definition · paragraph 5
Although as part of his ‘broad church’ claim that panpsychism is less a theory than a “meta-theory” of mindedness, Skrbina (2005:2) asserts that a “panpsychist-dualism” is not inherently contradictory on the grounds that a “Supreme Being” may have “granted a mind to all things,” I will claim on the contrary that it is in fact contradictory, since it would simply reconstitute dualism between original (Supreme Being) and derivative (all things) mindedness without resolving the issue of the nature of thinking things.
Definition · paragraph 2
Iain Hamilton Grant on the one hand, and the philosophy of nature on the other. To do this, I shall de- rive some salient features of this expanded address to the problem of panpsychism by contrasting them with ontological claims from which they may be considered to derive. .
Definition · paragraph 12
It is therefore assumed from the outset that thinking has no necessary relation to nature. Yet this is false unless we consider thought to arise outside nature. If we do not accept this, but affirm thinking as consisting of events in a physical world, some version of panpsychism becomes inevitable.
Definition · paragraph 1
chapter “All things think” Panpsychism and the metaphysics of nature Iain Hamilton Grant Panpsychism has both a negative and a positive value to contemporary metaphysics. Negatively, it provides a critique of the problem of epistemological and/or phe- nomenological access as a precondition of metaphysical validity.
Definition · paragraph 5
For if nature does not think, dualism follows; if it does, then nature is capable of more than the production of anoetic and inert substances with which it is usually and, in some quarters, grudgingly accredited. For now, however, we turn to the principle of finitude. The form in which fini- tude emerges as a problem for panpsychism is twofold: thinking substances (regardless of whether these be minds or bodies) and reflective consciousness.
Appears in sections
Brassier, Grant, and Speculative Realism Primary section
Analytic and speculative receptions of Land and the CCRU through Brassier, Grant, and adjacent philosophical lines.